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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Gregory Wayne Powell appeals from the judgment entered upon his
conditional guilty plea to lewd conduct. Powell contends the district court erred
in denying his motion to suppress the incriminating statements he made at his
parole hearing.
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
In 2007, Powell pled guilty to lewd conduct in Kootenai County Case No.
2006-14161 (“2006 Case”), and the court imposed a unified 16-year sentence
with seven years fixed. (See R., p.117; PSI, pp.2-3.) The victim in the 2006
Case was Powell’s adopted son, Z.A. (R., p.60; PSI, p.3.)
In July 2013, Powell had a parole hearing in the 2006 Case. (See R.,
p.117.) At the hearing, Powell admitted he had also engaged in lewd conduct
with his two biological sons, S.A. and W.A. (R., p.61.) The Commission of
Pardons and Parole granted Powell “a tentative parole date” pending completion
of programming. (R., p.63.) The tentative date was January 28, 2015. (R.,
p.63.)
Approximately four months after his parole hearing, and while he was still
incarcerated, Powell submitted to an interview by law enforcement. (R., pp.6581.) Powell was read Miranda1 warnings prior to the interview and agreed to talk
to the officers (R., p.65.) During the interview, Powell again admitted sexually
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Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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molesting two additional victims. (R., pp.73-74.)
Based on Powell’s admissions at the parole hearing, the state charged
him with two counts of lewd conduct for the offenses he committed against S.A.
and W.A.

(R., pp.27-28, 44-45.)

Powell filed a motion to suppress “any

statements” he made during his parole hearing and any “subsequent statements”
he made to any state agent. (R., p.50.) Powell argued that the incriminating
statements he made in conjunction with parole proceedings “were not made
freely and voluntarily.” (R., p.117.) Powell also argued that his Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination was violated and that he was denied his “right to
counsel.” (R., pp.117, 119.)
The district court denied Powell’s motion to suppress.

(R., p.130.)

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Powell pled guilty to one count of lewd conduct,
and the state agreed to dismiss the second count; Powell reserved the right to
challenge the denial of his suppression motion. (R., pp.132-133, 136-139.) The
court imposed a unified 20-year sentence with two years fixed to run concurrent
with the sentence in the 2006 Case. (R., pp.154-158.)
Powell timely appealed. (R., pp.160-161.)
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ISSUE
Powell states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Powell’s motion to
suppress because the statements used against him were taken in
violation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination?
(Appellant’s Brief, p.5.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Because the voluntary incriminating statements Powell made at his parole
hearing did not implicate, much less violate, the Fifth Amendment, has Powell
failed to show the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress those
statements?

3

ARGUMENT
Powell Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Motion To Suppress The
Incriminating Statements He Voluntarily Made At His Parole Hearing
A.

Introduction
Powell challenges the denial of his motion to suppress, arguing as he did

below that the state could not use the incriminating statements he made at his
parole hearing against him in a criminal proceeding. (Appellant’s Brief, pp.6-20.)
According to Powell, use of the statements violates his “Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination” because, he claims, he “faced a classic penalty
situation—he had to incriminate himself or forego his chance at parole.”
(Appellant’s Brief, p.6.) Powell’s argument fails on the underlying premise that
he “faced a classic penalty situation” because Powell was not compelled to
appear at a parole hearing. Moreover, Powell has failed to show his statements
were the result of unconstitutional compulsion as opposed to a voluntary choice
he made in exchange for the opportunity for parole.

Powell has, therefore,

failed to show the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress.
B.

Standard Of Review
“The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a

decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, [the appellate court] accepts the
trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but [the
Court] freely reviews the application of constitutional principles to the facts as
found.” State v. Faith, 141 Idaho 728, 730, 117 P.3d 142, 144 (Ct. App. 2005).
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C.

Powell’s Parole Hearing Did Not Create A “Classic Penalty Situation” That
Would Implicate The Fifth Amendment
“The Fifth Amendment provides that no person ‘shall be compelled in any

criminal case to be a witness against himself.’” Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70,
77 (1973).

This right, commonly referred to as the right against self-

incrimination, “not only protects the individual against himself in a criminal
prosecution but also privileges him not to answer official questions put to him in
any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers
might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings.”

Id.

Thus, “a witness

protected by the privilege may rightfully refuse to answer unless and until he is
protected at least against the use of his compelled answers and evidence
derived therefrom in any subsequent criminal case in which he is a defendant.”
Id. at 78 (citation omitted). If no such protection is afforded, and the defendant is
nevertheless compelled to answer, his answers are not admissible in a “later
criminal prosecution.” Id.
Applying the foregoing principles, the United States Supreme Court has
recognized certain circumstances that create a “classic penalty situation”
implicating the Fifth Amendment. For example, in Turley, the state summoned
two licensed architects to “testify before a grand jury investigating various
charges of conspiracy, bribery, and larceny.” 414 U.S. at 75-76. The architects
“were asked, but refused, to sign waivers of immunity, the effect of which would
have been to waive their right not to be compelled in a criminal case to be a
witness against themselves.” Id. at 76. As a result, the district attorney “notified
various contracting authorities” of the architects’ actions “and called attention to
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the applicable disqualification statutes,” after which the architects filed suit
“alleging that their existing contracts and future contracting privileges were
threatened and asserted that the pertinent statutory provisions” violated the Fifth
Amendment. Id. The Supreme Court agreed, holding, as it had in other cases,
“that answers elicited upon the threat of the loss of employment are compelled
and inadmissible in evidence.” Id. at 85.
The Supreme Court reached the same conclusion in Lefkowitz v.
Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801 (1977). At issue in Cunningham was a state law that
allowed “an officer of a political party [to] be subpoenaed by a grand jury or other
authorized tribunal and required to testify concerning the conduct of the party
office he occupies.” 431 U.S. at 802-803. Under that law, if “the officer refuses
to answer any question, or if he declines to waive immunity from the use of his
testimony against him in a later prosecution,” his “party office” would be
“immediately terminate[d]” and he would be prohibited from holding any public
office for five years.

Id.

The Court concluded the law was “constitutionally

indistinguishable from the coercive provisions” it struck down in Turley and other
cases because it “confronted appellee with grave consequences solely because
he refused to waive immunity from prosecution and give self-incriminating
testimony.” Id. at 807.
The fundamental difference between Turley and Cunningham and
Powell’s parole hearing is that both Turley and Cunningham involved a “classic
penalty situation” created by the state’s attempt to compel individuals to testify;
the state, however, did not compel Powell to seek parole.
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Powell cannot

legitimately claim he was placed in a “penalty situation” he created.

See

Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 434 (1984) (quotations and citation omitted)
(“In each of the so-called ‘penalty’ cases, the state not only compelled an
individual to appear and testify, but also sought to induce him to forgo the Fifth
Amendment privilege by threatening to impose economic or other sanctions
capable of forcing the self-incrimination which the Amendment forbids.”). This is
the very distinction the Supreme Court found significant in Ohio Adult Parole
Authority v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272 (1998).
In Woodard, the Court considered “whether giving inmates the option of
voluntarily participating in an interview as part of the clemency process violates
an inmate’s Fifth Amendment rights. 523 U.S. at 275. Woodard argued, in part,
that he should be given immunity for any statements made in relation to a
clemency proceeding because “in the [clemency] interview he may be forced to
answer questions; or, if he remains silent, his silence may be used against him.”
Id. at 285.

Otherwise, Woodard claimed, “the interview unconstitutionally

conditions his assertion of the right to pursue clemency on his waiver of the right
to remain silent.” Id. at 285-286.
The Supreme Court rejected Woodard’s argument, concluding Woodard’s
testimony at a clemency interview would not be “‘compelled’ within the meaning
of the Fifth Amendment.” Id. at 286. The Court reasoned: “It is difficult to see
how a voluntary interview could ‘compel’ respondent to speak. He merely faces
a choice quite similar to the sorts of choices that a criminal defendant must make
in the course of criminal proceedings, none of which has ever been held to
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violate the Fifth Amendment.” Id. In rejecting Woodard’s argument, the Court
noted the longstanding principle that a defendant who testifies in his own
defense cannot “claim the privilege against self-incrimination when the
prosecution [seeks] to cross-examine him.” Id. at 286-287 (citations omitted).
The Court concluded:
Here, respondent has the same choice of providing
information to the [Parole] Authority-at the risk of damaging his
case for clemency or for post-conviction relief-or of remaining
silent. But this pressure to speak in the hope of improving his
chance of being granted clemency does not make the interview
compelled. We therefore hold that the Ohio clemency interview,
even on assumptions most favorable to respondent’s claim, does
not violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled selfincrimination.
Woodard, 523 U.S. at 287-288.
There is no meaningful distinction between the clemency proceeding at
issue in Woodard and Powell’s parole hearing. Like Woodard, Powell “merely
face[d] a choice quite similar to the sorts of choices that a criminal defendant
must make in the course of criminal proceedings.” Woodard, 523 U.S. at 286.
That Powell may have “felt pressure to speak in the hope of improving his
chance of being [paroled]” did not make his statements compelled. Id. at 287.
On appeal, Powell does not discuss Woodard, but instead relies on the
Supreme Court’s opinion in McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24 (2002).2 (Appellant’s

2

Powell also relies on the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in United States v. Antelope,
395 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2005). Powell, however, is relying on Antelope for a
result that would be contrary to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Woodard and
McKune. Obviously, when given the choice between the two, it is Supreme
Court authority that controls, not circuit precedent.
8

Brief, pp.7-11.)

McKune does not support the conclusion Powell wants this

Court to reach.
McKune involved a civil rights action arising from a prisoner’s complaint
that the Kansas Department of Correction’s order “that he enter a prison
treatment program,” and his refusal to do so, violated his Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination because the treatment program included
incentives to participate, such as more privileges while incarcerated. 536 U.S. at
29-30. McKune refused to participate in the program “on the ground that the
required disclosures of his criminal history would violate his Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination.” Id. at 31. The Supreme Court framed the
question presented as: “whether the State’s program, and the consequences for
nonparticipation in it, combine to create a compulsion that encumbers the
constitutional right.” Id. at 35. The Court held that the answer to that question is
no:
Respondent fails to cite a single case from this Court holding
that the denial of discrete prison privileges for refusal to participate
in a rehabilitation program amounts to unconstitutional compulsion.
Instead, relying on the so-called penalty cases, respondent treats
the fact of his incarceration as if it were irrelevant. Those cases,
however, involved free citizens given the choice between invoking
the Fifth Amendment privilege and sustaining their economic
livelihood. Those principles are not easily extended to the prison
context, where inmates surrender upon incarceration their rights to
pursue a livelihood and to contract freely with the State, as well as
many other basic freedoms.
McKune, 536 U.S. at 40 (citations omitted).
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In rejecting McKune’s argument, the Court reiterated the principles it
articulated in Woodard with respect to the many choices criminal defendants
face that do not offend the Fifth Amendment:
Prison context or not, respondent’s choice is marked less by
compulsion than by choices the Court has held give no rise to a
self-incrimination claim. The “criminal process, like the rest of the
legal system, is replete with situations requiring the making of
difficult judgments as to which course to follow. Although a
defendant may have a right, even of constitutional dimensions, to
following whichever course he chooses, the Constitution does not
by that token always forbid requiring him to choose.” It is well
settled that the government need not make the exercise of the Fifth
Amendment privilege cost free.
McKune, 536 U.S. at 41 (quoting McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 213
(1971), other citations omitted). The Court held that, as in Woodard, the choice
McKune faced did not violate his Fifth Amendment rights. Id. at 44. McKune
does not support Powell’s alleged Fifth Amendment violation.

If anything, it

further illustrates why Powell’s claim fails.
The Idaho Court of Appeals engaged in a similar analysis in State v. Van
Komen, 2015 WL 7785342 (Idaho App. Dec. 4, 2015). In Van Komen, the trial
court retained jurisdiction and ordered the defendant to submit to a polygraph.
Id. at *1. Van Komen refused and the district court relinquished jurisdiction in
part because Van Komen did not take the polygraph as ordered. Id. at *2. Van
Komen claimed his choice between participating in a polygraph or invoking his
Fifth Amendment right and having his silence used against him was
constitutionally invalid. Id. at *1-2. The Court rejected Van Komen’s claim and
stated, in relevant part:

“While Van Komen’s choice between refusing the
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polygraph and receiving his underlying sentence was no doubt a difficult one, the
court did not violate the Constitution by requiring him to choose.” Id. at *4.
Powell contends “the Van Komen opinion should not govern here”
because, he argues, the Court’s opinion in Van Komen “turned on an erroneous
interpretation of McKune” and contained an interpretation of Murphy, supra, that
“is not entirely accurate.” (Appellant’s Brief, p.19.) That Powell disagrees with
the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of McKune and Murphy does not show that
the Court in Van Komen was incorrect in its conclusion that the choice Van
Komen faced was not an unconstitutional one. To the contrary, setting aside any
disputes Powell has about interpretation of Supreme Court precedent, the Court
of Appeals’ conclusion in Van Komen is consistent with McKune, Murphy, and
Woodard. Thus, while the opinion in Van Komen is certainly pertinent to the
extent it is analogous to the issue presented in this case, it does not have to
“govern” this case in order to reject Powell’s argument because Powell’s
argument is contrary to Supreme Court precedent.
Because Powell’s parole hearing did not implicate the Fifth Amendment,
Powell’s claim that he was entitled to suppression based on a Fifth Amendment
violation necessarily fails.

3

3

Powell has not argued, much less established, that the incriminating
statements he made to law enforcement four months after his parole hearing are
subject to suppression as fruit of the poisonous tree. (See generally Appellant’s
Brief, pp.6-20.) Any such claim is, therefore, waived. See State v. Zichko, 129
Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) (“A party waives an issue cited on
appeal if either authority or argument is lacking, not just if both are lacking.”).
11

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment and
sentence entered upon Powell’s conditional guilty plea to lewd conduct.
DATED this 31st day of March, 2016.

_/s/ Jessica M. Lorello__
JESSICA M. LORELLO
Deputy Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 31st day of March, 2016, served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an
electronic copy to:
MAYA P. WALDRON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.
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_/s/ Jessica M. Lorello__
JESSICA M. LORELLO
Deputy Attorney General
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